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1.  Introduction 
Volunteering is an important activity in modern economies. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, approximately 61.8 million Americans, or 26.4% of the U.S. population, 
volunteered at least once through or for an organization between September 2007 and 
September 2008. For Europe, a Eurobarometer (2007) survey revealed that in 2006 34% of 
the population aged 15 and over, living in the 25 EU-Member States, claimed to participate 
actively or to do voluntary work in a non-profit organization. How can we explain that such a 
large fraction of the population is apparently willing to work without receiving a financial 
remuneration? 
 
Psychologists have always been interested in the motivations behind volunteering and helping 
behaviour and have suggested and tested a wide range of alternative hypotheses. Economists 
are traditionally more reluctant to introduce motivations (or, in their jargon, preference 
variation) in their explanatory models. However, the analysis of volunteering (and donating) 
behaviour is an exception to this tradition (see also Prouteau and Wolff, 2008; Schokkaert, 
2006). In fact, the importance of volunteering activities raises a puzzle for the rational choice 
paradigm. The most natural hypothesis for explaining volunteering is to interpret it as a 
voluntary contribution of time for the production of a ‘public good’. Yet, if individuals are in 
the first place motivated by such a concern for the public good, rational free-rider theory 
predicts that in large populations contributions should be minimal, a hypothesis which does 
not fit the empirical reality. To avoid this free-rider prediction, alternative motivations have 
been put forward, all implying that volunteering does not only yield public but also private 
benefits to the volunteers. These private benefits can be either of an instrumental nature or 
related to psychological feelings of ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). While the source of 
these warm glow feelings is not always unambiguously defined, its most common  
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interpretations (related to a sense of duty, or to the desire of being socially rewarded by 
obeying generally accepted norms) are strikingly related to the motives that also appear in the 
psychological literature. Disentangling the structure of motivations behind volunteering 
behaviour is interesting from a theoretical point of view as it is one of the domains where 
findings from the psychological and the economic literature can be mutually enriching, and 
were both the potential and the limitations of the rational choice paradigm come strongly to 
the fore.  
 
A better understanding of the motivations underlying volunteering behaviour is also important 
from a social policy point of view. First, the underlying reasons for volunteering determine 
how individuals adjust their contribution in reaction to an increase of the time donated by 
others, or in reaction to improved government provision. If giving is motivated by concern for 
a public good, contributions by others and by the government may crowd-out the own 
contributions of free-riding donors, as they are considered to be perfect substitutes for each 
other. However, there should be no similar crowding-out effect if people donate their time for 
their private benefit, as this benefit derives only from the amount of their own contribution 
(Andreoni, 1990; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987; Schiff, 1990). In this 
case volunteering may even be stimulated by government contributions, as these may spread 
information or act as a signal that the cause is socially valuable – and hence that contributing 
is also a duty for the citizens. 
 
Second, the best way to attract and to retain volunteers in a non-profit organization is to fulfil 
their expectations (Brudney, 1990; Clary et al., 1992). Therefore, understanding why 
individuals are interested in volunteering enables volunteer coordinators to optimize their 
recruitment efforts by organizing them around the needs of their target group. Moreover,  
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insights concerning volunteers’ motivations are also important in explaining why individuals 
choose to volunteer rather than to donate money, which again is useful information for 
charitable organizations. 
 
In this paper we use direct survey information to see which motives are most important to 
explain peoples’ volunteering decisions. While the literature suggests several possible 
motives for volunteering, little is known about how they simultaneously operate and about the 
impact of the different motives (or combinations of motives) on the amount of time spent in 
volunteering. More specifically, we focus on the dichotomy between concern for the public 
good on the one hand and private benefits on the other hand. We analyse whether this 
distinction is empirically meaningful and whether the free-riding hypothesis is useful to 
understand reality. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 distinguishes more explicitly the different 
motives for volunteering and formulates our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and 
contains a first exploratory analysis of the hypotheses. The results of a more elaborate 
statistical model are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the implications of our results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Motives for volunteering 
Different explanations of volunteering have been proposed in the literature. Traditionally the 
focus is on how socio-economic variables influence the amount of volunteering time. These 
variables typically serve as proxies for personal living situation and/or human, social and 
cultural capital (see Smith, 1994; Wilson, 2000 for comprehensive reviews). Economists  
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would interpret this approach as reflecting the assumption of ‘constant and identical 
preferences’. Apart from this research into the socio-economic drivers of volunteering 
behaviour, a number of authors have also studied the influence of motivations. Generally, 
three groups of explanations can be distinguished. 
 
The first explanation states that volunteers are driven by the desire to increase the level of 
provision of some ‘public good’ (Duncan, 1999; Schiff, 1990). This motivation has been 
called ‘pure altruism’ (Andreoni, 1990). It implies that the value an individual attributes to her 
own contributions is equal to the value she attributes to the contributions of others and that it 
does not make a difference whether she herself or someone else is responsible for the 
contributions that bring the public good to the desired level. Rational choice theory predicts 
that with this motivation ‘free-rider’ problems are to be expected (Marwell, 1982; Samuelson, 
1954). In large groups all individuals receive the collective good, but no single member’s 
efforts can significantly affect its production. All individuals may want the public good to be 
available, yet they would rather let someone else make the necessary contributions (Weisbrod, 
1975). Moreover, tax-funded government expenditures to provide a public good will reduce 
private giving, potentially dollar for dollar, as people cut their voluntary contributions in 
response to the higher taxes (Bergstrom et al., 1986). Applied to volunteering, these 
theoretical models imply that individuals may be strongly ‘motivated’ (or claim to be strongly 
motivated) by concern for the public good, yet volunteer little. We predict that when people 
hold a public good motivation, the strength of this motivation will have only a limited effect 
on actual volunteering. 
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A second view holds that the volunteer is driven by feelings of ‘warm glow’
1  following from 
his ‘good deeds’ (Andreoni, 1990), by pride (Piliavin and Charng, 1990) or by prestige and 
reputation gains (Schiff, 1990). A volunteer that is solely motivated by warm glow does not 
care about the absolute level of provision of the public good, but only seeks the private 
psychological benefits that ensue directly from his or her own donation of time or money. 
 
Thirdly, volunteering can be used as an ‘instrument’ or as an investment to indirectly obtain 
other beneficial private outcomes. One resultant benefit of volunteering is that it leads to the 
acquisition of useful skills and experience and thus serves as an investment in human capital 
(Day and Devlin, 1998; Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987; Schram and Dunsing, 1981). Likewise, 
volunteering can be used as a way to build, maintain and strengthen friendly relationships 
(Glaeser et al., 2002; Prouteau and Wolff, 2008). Moreover, simply enjoying the work may 
also drive volunteers (Davis-Smith, 1998; Lynn and Davis-Smith, 1991). An important 
difference with the warm glow view explained above, is that if volunteers are driven only by 
‘instrumental motivations’, volunteering will be equally meaningful to them even if they 
would know they are unproductive in terms of producing a public good. Note that these 
instrumental benefits can, for the most part, only be achieved by volunteering, contrary to the 
public good and warm glow benefits which can also be acquired by donating money. 
 
We predict that when individuals hold warm glow or instrumental motivations for 
volunteering, they will receive a private benefit from volunteering which directly derives 
from the amount of time they themselves give. Hence, the more strongly people hold these 
motivations, the more they will volunteer.  
                                                      
1 ‘Warm glow’ captures positive feelings, like an improved self-image, but also a reduction in negative feelings, 
like guilt or social pressure (Andreoni, 1990).  
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Given the mitigated support that the literature has found for each of these three theoretical 
models (Prouteau and Wolff, 2004), we follow Smith (1994) in adopting the perspective that 
the different models are complementary. This paper aims to examine the (relative) effects that 
holding these distinct types of motivations have on volunteering. We formulate three 
hypotheses: 
 
H1:  Information about motivations to volunteer contains additional explanatory power over 
socio-demographic characteristics in predicting the actual amount of volunteering. 
H2:  The stronger the warm glow and instrumental motivations, the larger the degree of 
volunteering. 
H3:  The influence of the motivation to contribute to a public good on the degree of 
volunteering is negligible in large populations. 
 
According to Rose-Ackerman (1996), empirical work has not been very successful in 
providing hard evidence on the motivations for charitable giving. Bradsley (2000) notes that 
direct tests about the warm glow motive have been difficult to implement, because this 
hypothesis is compatible with many patterns of behaviour. In order to circumvent these issues 
and to study the simultaneous behavioural implications of different motivational influences, 
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3.  Description of the Data 
 
The data used in this paper originates from the first wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which was conducted in ten European countries in 2004. 
SHARE is a multidisciplinary database that contains micro data on health, socio-economic 
status and social and family networks of some 22,000 individuals of fifty years and over 
(Börsch-Supan et al., 2005). The dataset also contains responses of individuals who are below 
fifty years of age, as spouses are always interviewed irrelevant of their age. The mean age of 
the total sample is 64 years (SD=9.95).
2 It is obvious that this sample is only representative for 
the elderly, and not for the general population. This is no problem for our analysis, however, 
which will focus on the relationship between different motivations and the amount of 
volunteering at an individual level. 
 
The SHARE dataset contains information on whether the respondents did or did not volunteer 
in the month before the interview, and if they volunteer, whether they do it almost monthly, 
weekly or daily. The answers to these questions are summarized in Table 1. On average, 14% 
of the observed (elderly) European population engaged in voluntary or charity work in the 




Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                      
2 The ten countries in release one of the first wave of SHARE were Denmark, Sweden, Austria, France, 
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Greece (Börsch-Supan et al., 2005). On average, the 
dataset contains 2,198 observations per country (SD = 660). Sweden has the largest number of observations 
(2,954) while Switzerland has the lowest sample size (938). As volunteering drops sharply at extremely old age 
(Glass et al., 1995) and to ensure sample coherence, outliers were removed based on age. An observation was 
declared an age outlier if it lies outside of the interval [median – 2,5 x SD; median + 2,5 x SD]. Accordingly, 
observations younger than 36 (0,1% of sample) or older than 89 (1,2% of sample) were removed. 
3 In Spain and Greece the percentage of volunteers was only 2% and 3% respectively. As the resulting number of 
observations is too small to allow for a meaningful empirical analysis, we excluded Spain and Greece from our 
analysis.   
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Apart from the large sample size, one key advantage of the SHARE dataset is that it contains 
an exhaustive set of socio-economic variables and thus allows the inclusion of nearly all 
socio-economic predictors identified in the literature. Even more important for our purposes, 
volunteers were also asked to indicate their motivations for volunteering. They could pick 
none, one, or more motives from the list displayed in Table 2. This results in a series of seven 
dummy variables, which measure subjective motivation. Enjoying volunteering and 
contributing to a useful cause are cited most often as reasons for volunteering. The items 
“because I feel obligated to do it” and “for personal achievement” are endorsed the least.
4 
The seven motivational items can be interpreted as proxies for the level of the three broader 
groups of motivations identified in the previous section. The answers “to meet other people”, 
“because I enjoy it” and “to use my skills or to keep fit” are clearly indicators of volunteering 
to indirectly achieve a resultant benefit. They point to ‘instrumental’ reasons for volunteering. 
“Being needed” relates to the desire to conform to the norms and expectations of one’s circle 
of acquaintances. If an individual volunteers because he “feels obligated”, he does so to avoid 
negative feelings, like guilt, about not doing so. Both these items are indicative of a ‘warm 
glow’ motivation. Individuals who volunteer “to contribute something useful” state that they 
wish to contribute to a good or service which benefits the community at large. This item is an 
indicator of willingness to contribute to a ‘public good’. It is difficult to provide an ex ante 
intuition about the final item, “for personal achievement”. It can arguably be indicative of 
both the warm glow and the instrumental motivations. 
 
                                                      
4 Since our sample is only representative for the elderly, it is of course impossible to extrapolate our findings 
about the relative importance of the different motivations to the general population. It has been found previously 
that older adults tend to be motivated to a greater extent by service or community obligation concerns and that 
both younger and older volunteers are more motivated by achieving outcomes that are related to interpersonal 
relationships than middle aged individuals (Okun et al., 1998; Omoto et al., 2000).  
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Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Exploratory factor analysis, using the principal component factoring technique, followed by a 
quartimax rotation, was employed to check more formally whether these three dimensions are 
present in the data. Following Fabrigar et al.'s (1999) recommendation, a number of oblique 
rotations were tried first. As correlations between factors were low (warm glow and 
instrumental: r(2462) = .05,  p < .05; warm glow and public good: r(2462) = .13,  p < .01; 
public good and instrumental r(2462) = .20,  p < .01), an orthogonal rotation was preferable 
for ease of interpretation (Rummel, 1970). Table 3 displays the factor loadings and the 
communalities for the different items. 58.4% of the total variance in the seven original items 
is explained by three common components. The final communality estimates are reasonably 
good, except for the items “because I feel obligated to do it” (0.13) and “for personal 
achievement” (0.10). Only respectively 18% and 14% of volunteers indicate these to be 
important motivations for volunteering. As a comparison, all other items received between 
31% and 68% positive responses and their communalities ranged from 0.48 to 0.96. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Considering that the questionnaire was not especially set up for this kind of analysis, the 
results in Table 3 are rather satisfactory and confirm the presence of the three proposed 
underlying latent variables. Using the component score coefficient matrix, we can now 
calculate the motivational profile for each respondent. A motivational profile consists of a 
factor score for each of the three identified factors (or latent variables). As the analysis 
indicates that the factors are orthogonal, the factor scores can be interpreted as the strength of  
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separate but coexisting motivations – linked to the three theoretical constructs described in the 
previous section. 
 
A first look at Table 2 suggests that the data are well in line with our theoretical hypotheses. 
There is little difference in reported importance of the “to contribute something useful” item 
between the volunteers that donate less and more time. Concerning the warm glow items, 
patterns are in the expected direction. The more someone feels that she is needed or feels 
obligated, the more she will volunteer. For the instrumental motivations, the relationship 
appears to be quite strong and is in the expected direction for the “because I enjoy it” and “to 
use my skills or to keep fit” items. The relationship seems weaker and non-linear for the item 
“meeting other people”.
5 Of course, the raw data in Table 2 may be misleading. Let us 
therefore now turn to a more refined multivariate analysis. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
We want to test our three hypotheses within an empirical model of the actual amount of 
volunteering. Since we only observe whether individuals do not volunteer or volunteer almost 
monthly, weekly or daily, our data are not linear but ordinal. Moreover since donations of time 
cannot be less than zero, the observed dependent variable is truncated at zero. As no truncated 
model for ordinal data is well established, and as we want to allow for different explanatory 
variables in the model of the decision about whether or not to volunteer on the one hand and 
the model of the decision about how much to volunteer on the other (Bergstrom et al., 1986), 
                                                      
5 This might be due to a ceiling effect. Volunteering weekly might suffice to achieve respondents’ need to meet 
people.  
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we adapted the well known Tobit II model for truncated, continuous data by replacing the 
OLS regression in the second step by an Ordered Probit. The model then becomes: 
 
0
* * = i y  if  0 , 1
* ≤ + = i i i X y ε α  
i i i Z y , 2
* * ε β + =  if  0 , 1
* > + = i i i X y ε α  (1) 
j Yi =  if  j i j A y A < ≤ −
* *
1 ;  −∞ = 0 A , +∞ = J A ;  [ ] J j , 1 ∈   
 
Yi  is the observed discrete random variable that indicates which class of volunteering 
individual i is in. yi
* and yi
** are the unobservable random variables equal to the amount of 
volunteering people respectively would like to do and actually do. The variables included and 
the coefficients estimated in the first and second stage are given by respectively Xi and Zi and 
α and β. Both error terms ε1,i ~ ) 1 , 0 ( N  and ε2,i ~ ) 1 , 0 ( N  may be correlated. The Aj  represent the 
threshold values of yi
**.  
 
The model was estimated by Heckman’s (1976) procedure. To allow a tough test of our first 
hypothesis, we included in the model nearly all socio-economic variables that are found 
relevant in the literature. After excluding individuals who did not respond to all questions of 
interest, we were left with a subsample of 17,012 individuals of whom 2,464 had volunteered 
in the month before the interview took place. 
 
To check robustness, different versions of the empirical model were estimated. Estimation 
results are summarised in Table 4. The selection step remains the same between versions. It 
includes all relevant socio-demographic variables and country dummies to control for the  
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most important country specific effects. 
6,7 The second, quantity decision step differs between 
the models. In the first version, which serves as a baseline (1), the quantity step includes all 
relevant socio-economic variables and country dummies. In the second version (2), the factor 
scores, describing the motivational profile of the individual respondents, are included in 
addition to the socio-demographic variables. In order to avoid relying solely on the results of 
the factor analysis, we also estimated an alternative model (3) that contains the original 
motivational items as found in the SHARE database. Finally, to test the model’s sensitivity to 
country differences, the central model was re-estimated including country by motivation 
cross-effects (4).  
 
In all versions, both steps of the model perform significantly better than the null model on all 
traditionally used indicators. The inverse Mill’s ratios are insignificant, suggesting that there 
is no strong selection effect. The results for the socio-economic variables largely replicate the 
established literature and remain largely unaffected by the inclusion of the motivational 
factors.
8 Even though the list of socio-economic variables is very extensive, introducing the 
three motivational factors (model 2) constitutes a significant improvement over the model 
                                                      
6 The literature describes health (Bowen et al., 2000) and community integration (Ryan et al., 2005) as important 
barriers to volunteering. To ensure that the global model is not only identified by the model assumptions, 
information about individuals’ mental and physical health and proxies for their integration in their local 
communities was included in the first stage only. Specification test confirmed that these variables determine 
whether someone volunteers or not, but not how much time a volunteer donates. 
7 Sweden (the country with the largest number of observations) served as reference. 
8 We find an inverted-U age pattern for the decision about whether or not to volunteer. Respondents between 60 
and 64 have the largest chance of being a volunteer. This peak comes at an older age than the one found by 
Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) and Prouteau and Wolff (2006), but is in line with the findings of Day and Devlin 
(1996). The peak might be explained by a “retirement shock” effect. Exchange theory suggests that people who 
have just retired, but who are unable to adjust to their new situation, use volunteering to replace psychic and 
social benefits formerly derived from paid employment (Midlarsky and Kahana, 1994). This effect would then 
gradually fade away as people get accustomed to their retirement. There is no influence of age on the amount of 
time a volunteer contributes. The results confirm Clotfelter’s (1985) conclusion that there is a significant positive 
effect of available hours on number of hours volunteered. Living in smaller communities encourages 
volunteering. We find large marginal effects associated with education (see e.g. Day and Devlin, 1996; Prouteau 
and Wolff, 2006). A woman is equally likely to be a volunteer than a man, but male volunteers spend more time 
volunteering. Having children in the household increases the chances of being a volunteer (see also Bowman, 
2004; Schiff, 1990). Our controls for health status and integration in the local community give the expected 
results.  
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containing only socio-economic factors and country dummies (χ² (3, N=2464)=98, p<.001). 
Adding (in model 3) the seven original motivational dummies to the baseline gives a similar 
result (χ² (7, N=2464)=142, p<.001). These results firmly confirm our first hypothesis. 
Motivational components definitively hold explanatory power beyond that of the traditionally 
included socio-economic variables. 
 
The second hypothesis states that stronger warm glow and instrumental motives should lead 
to a larger degree of volunteering. The third hypothesis implies that the marginal effect of the 
motivation to contribute to the public good on the number of hours donated should be small to 
non-existent. As can be seen in Table 4, all three motivational factors exert a statistically 
significant influence in model (2). However, the relative magnitudes of the marginal effects 
evaluated at the covariate means, displayed in Table 5 reveal that the influence of the 
instrumental motive factor and the warm glow factor is about three times as high as that of the 
public goods factor. Moreover, Table 4 shows that the significance level is higher for the 
instrumental (p < .0001) and warm glow factors (p < .0001) than for the public goods factor 
(p < .05).  χ² tests ((Train, 2003) indicate that, while it can not be rejected that the 
instrumental value and warm glow components’ coefficients are equal (χ² (1, N=2464)=2, 
NS), the effect of the public good factor is significantly smaller than both that of the 
instrumental (χ² (1, N=2464)=16, p < .01) and warm glow (χ² (1, N=2464)=6, p < .05) factor. 
The third model specification (3), in which individual items are included, is even more 
transparent. Both warm glow items and two out of the three instrumental items significantly 
predict the amount of time donated. The public good item has no significant influence. A chi-
square test does not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the items “because I enjoy it” 
and “to use my skills or to keep fit” are equal, those of “because I am needed” and “because I 
feel obligated to do it” are equal and that there is no influence of the items “to meet other  
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people” and “to contribute something useful” (χ² (4, N=2464)=4, NS). These more detailed 
results confirm our theoretical predictions. Warm glow and instrumental items exert a 
significant influence on the amount of volunteering time, while an increased desire to 
contribute to a public good has no such influence. 
 
In order to test the model’s sensitivity to country differences, the central model was re-
estimated without country dummies.
9 While this significantly worsens the model performance 
(χ² (7, N=2464) = 66, p<.001), parameter estimates for the other variables are robust. To 
further test the robustness of our results for country effects, model (2) was extended by adding 
all country by motivation cross-effects as explanatory variables. The estimates of the resulting 
model (4), which performs significantly better than that without cross-effects (χ² (21, 
N=2464) = 36, p<.05), give further support to our assertions.
10 Adding country by motivation 
cross-effects causes the effect of the public good motivation for the European sample as a 
whole to become insignificant, while the estimated impact of the warm glow and instrumental 
motivation becomes more important. Examination of the cross-effects reveals that only in 
Germany the strength of the public good motivation does exert an influence on volunteering 
frequency. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
                                                      
9 These results are not shown in Table 4, but can be obtained from the authors on request. 
10 While all cross-effects were included in the model, only marginally significant cross-effects are displayed in 
Table 4. Full results are available from the authors.  
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In summary, we can state that the amount of volunteering chosen by volunteers is 
significantly affected by the level of warm glow and instrumental motivations. A higher stated 
importance of contributing to a public good has a small to insignificant impact on the actual 
amount of time supplied by volunteers. 
 
 
5.  Discussion 
Direct survey information on stated motivations adds significantly to the explanation of the 
amount of time volunteers choose to donate, over and above socio-economic variables. 
Moreover, the pattern of our empirical results makes sense in the light of theoretical 
considerations. These findings complement those of Smith et al. (1995) and Schokkaert & 
Van Ootegem (2000) who came to a similar conclusion for money donations to charitable 
causes.  
 
When volunteering yields larger private benefits for the individual, this does lead to an 
increased volunteering frequency. However, individuals who are more strongly motivated by 
a desire to contribute to the public good do not necessarily volunteer more. This is suggestive 
evidence for Andreoni’s (1989) argument that even if donors care about the level of the public 
good, free-riding makes this concern an implausible explanation for the pattern of donations 
and volunteering which is observed. “Mixed altruism” is a feature of the real world, in which 
individuals are driven by different motivations. 
 
The fact that the instrumental motivation significantly influences the volunteering frequency 
implies a decreased substitutability between gifts of money and gifts of time. One can 
contribute to a public good and even get warm glow and prestige by donating money.  
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However, the instrumental benefits of volunteering are generally not obtainable by giving 
cash to charitable causes. 
 
The results of this paper may also contribute to explaining the diverse findings in the 
literature on volunteers’ reactions to government expenditures (e.g. Day and Devlin, 1996; 
Duncan, 1999; Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987). Our results imply that the mix of motivations 
in the relevant population will determine individuals’ reactions to government spending. 
When volunteers are only motivated by a desire to contribute to a public good, their own and 
the government’s provision of this good are perfect substitutes. However, if volunteers are 
sufficiently motivated by warm glow or instrumental motivations, little crowding out should 
occur after a change in government expenditures. If government spending enables volunteers 
to better achieve their warm glow or instrumental goals by making their time donations more 
effective, it may even cause ‘crowding in’ (Prouteau and Wolff, 2008; Schiff, 1985). 
 
Our finding that the ‘public good’ or ‘pure altruism’ motivation for volunteering, which has 
been shown to be of importance at the level of neural activity (Harbaugh et al., 2007), may be 
of little consequence in real behaviour parallels several findings from psychology. Indeed, 
Stahl and Haruvy (2006) find that contributions to a public good dwindle as group size 
increases. They suggest a perceived reduced effect of one individual’s contribution on the 
level of public good as whole and diffusion of responsibility as explanations for this decrease. 
When individuals know that many others are present, they do not bear the full burden of 
responsibility as individuals (Darley and Latane, 1968), and they expect that someone else 
will bear the necessary sacrifice. 
 
Individually describing and showing small, identifiable beneficiary groups may make the  
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target more vivid and hence redirect contributors’ focus from their contribution to the public 
good to the warm glow they will receive from their contribution. This is illustrated by Small 
& Loewenstein’s (2003) finding that people give more to more vividly described, identifiable 
victims than to statistically described victims, even though the statistically described victims 
are more numerous and contributions to their cause would lead to a greater marginal benefit 
than contributions to the identifiable victims. Thus, in accordance with our findings, Small & 
Loewenstein (2003) show that people value warm glow more than contributing to the public 
good, as donating to the more vividly described, identifiable victims yields relatively more 
warm glow while donating to the statistically described victims would lead to a larger 
increase in public good. 
 
An alternative to redirecting peoples’ attention away from their public good motivation could 
be to counteract feelings of diffusion of responsibility. One possibility is targeting charitable 
requests to small sets of donors, making them aware that they belong to a limited group of 
possible contributors. This principle was demonstrated by Barron and Yechiam (2002), who 
found that recipients were more likely to comply to a private email request when they are the 
only person in the ‘To’ box than when the email was addressed to a number of people 
simultaneously. 
 
Finally, donors' underlying motivations have practical implications for non-profit 
organizations (Clary et al., 1992). ‘Selling’ volunteering by focusing on the potential impact 
of the volunteer on the promoted good cause may get a lot of people to think that the cause is 
worth volunteering for, but result in little extra volunteering. Instead, volunteer coordinators 
should look at what private benefits their target group seeks to gain from the volunteering 
exchange. When designing their organisational structure and the content of volunteers’ jobs,  
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non-profit managers should make sure that there is a right balance between being productive 
in creating the public good and creating the private benefits that volunteers seek. If 
instrumental considerations dominate, non-profit managers should focus on communicating 
what volunteering can result in, besides helping others. Why and how volunteering makes 
volunteers feel good about themselves should be emphasized to satisfy peoples’ warm glow 
motivation. Encouraging volunteers to work in close contact with the beneficiaries may prove 
to be a particularly effective strategy to increase their warm glow feelings. If people want 
others to view them as good and generous, solicitation by friends and neighbours will be 
effective in increasing contributions (Bowman, 2004; Freeman, 1997). 
 
While the SHARE dataset offers several advantages, its main limitation is in the measurement 
of the motivations for volunteering. It does not contain information on the hypothetical 
motivations of non-volunteers and therefore does not allow analysing the influence of the 
three groups of motives on the decision to volunteer or not. In addition, the level of detail on 
motivations is limited, which may induce measurement error in the self reported motives. 
Respondents who are slightly motivated by for example moral obligation might give the same 
answer as those who are highly motivated by it. Still, given the size of the dataset, the fact 
that basic tendencies seem to be captured by these simple responses and the presence of 
sufficient variation in the items, we feel that the level of detail provided by the SHARE 
dataset suffices to accomplish our goal of exploring the importance of motivations in 
explaining volunteering. More detailed information about volunteers’ motivations is 
necessary if one wants to draw stronger conclusions. 
 
Finally, the SHARE-data are not representative for the overall population. However, while it 
is likely that the average importance of the different motivations differs between age groups,  
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there are no strong reasons to suspect that the influence of these motivations on the amount of 
time donated should also differ. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to further investigate the role of volunteers’ motivations in 
explaining the time donated to charitable causes. While previous work often concentrates 
either on the warm glow, the public good or the instrumental explanation for volunteering, we 
studied the simultaneous effect of different motivational influences by incorporating direct 
information on motivations into the models. Using data from eight European countries, we 
showed that the inclusion of direct information on motivations increases the model’s 
explanatory power beyond that of the traditionally included socio-economic variables. In 
addition, our results suggest that the more people hold warm glow and instrumental 
motivations, the larger the degree of volunteering. However, as theoretically predicted by 
public goods theory, the influence of the motivation to contribute to a public good on the 
degree of volunteering is shown to be quite limited in large populations. When explaining 
volunteering, economic and psychological approaches are deeply complementary.  
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Less than weekly Almost weekly Almost daily
Europe 14% 37% 48% 15%
Austria 9% 54% 43% 3%
Germany 11% 37% 47% 16%
Sweden 18% 45% 41% 14%
The Netherlands 22% 24% 61% 15%
Italy 7% 37% 45% 18%
France 13% 36% 42% 22%
Denmark 18% 40% 49% 11%








Item Mean Mean by volunteering frequency Classification
To meet other people 40% Instrumental
less than weekly 35%
almost weekly 44%
almost daily 40%
Because I enjoy it 67% Instrumental
less than weekly 58%
almost weekly 72%
almost daily 76%
To use my skills or to keep fit 32% Instrumental
less than weekly 21%
almost weekly 38%
almost daily 40%
To contribute something useful 67% Public good
less than weekly 63%
almost weekly 70%
almost daily 68%
Because I am needed 46% Warm glow
less than weekly 39%
almost weekly 49%
almost daily 53%
Because I feel obligated to do it 18% Warm glow
less than weekly 15%
almost weekly 19%
almost daily 22%
For personal achievement 14%              /
less than weekly 11%
almost weekly 15%
almost daily 19%   
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Table 3
Factor loadings and communalities
Item Factor loadings Communalities
Instrumental Warm glow Public good
To meet other people 0.78 -0.07 -0.13 0.62
To contribute something useful 0.09 0.01 0.94 0.89
For personal achievement 0.27 0.03 0.17 0.10
Because I am needed 0.19 0.95 0.01 0.95
Because I enjoy it 0.69 -0.04 -0.11 0.49
To use my skills or to keep fit 0.59 0.14 0.33 0.48
Because I feel obligated to do it -0.06 0.36 0.01 0.13  
 





coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value
Constant -1.443 ***-13.19 0.003 0.01 -0.067 -0.15 -0.564 -1.24 -0.039 -0.09
Cut point distance 1.442 *** 40.98 1.478 *** 40.92 1.495 *** 40.84 1.490 *** 40.91
Marital status
M a r r i e d R e fR e fR e fR e fR e f
Never married -0.033 -0.52 0.243 * 1.94 0.227 * 1.80 0.237 * 1.88 0.219 * 1.72
Divorced 0.004 0.06 0.273 ** 2.57 0.247 ** 2.31 0.242 ** 2.25 0.233 ** 2.17
Widowed 0.001 0.03 0.002 0.02 -0.020 -0.21 -0.030 -0.31 -0.025 -0.26
Not married, living with partner -0.314 *** -3.40 -0.030 -0.15 -0.077 -0.37 -0.070 -0.34 -0.056 -0.27
Number of children <18y old 0.126 *** 3.35 0.025 0.37 0.044 0.65 0.050 0.73 0.047 0.69
Female -0.042 -1.45 -0.152 *** -2.74 -0.161 *** -2.89 -0.160 *** -2.84 -0.164 *** -2.91
Age
Between 35 and 49 0.098 1.25 -0.036 -0.24 -0.078 -0.52 -0.032 -0.21 -0.050 -0.33
Between 50 and 54 Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Between 55 and 59 0.081 * 1.93 0.014 0.17 0.007 0.09 0.017 0.21 0.008 0.10
Between 60 and 64 0.100 ** 2.12 0.087 0.97 0.096 1.07 0.110 1.22 0.093 1.02
Between 65 and 69 0.048 0.86 0.063 0.60 0.070 0.66 0.106 0.99 0.068 0.64
Between 70 and 79 -0.057 -1.01 0.112 1.05 0.105 0.98 0.138 1.28 0.096 0.88
Between 80 and 89 -0.363 *** -4.60 -0.017 -0.10 -0.005 -0.03 0.012 0.07 -0.021 -0.12
Occupational status
Retired 0.273 *** 6.11 0.371 *** 3.91 0.370 *** 3.86 0.381 *** 3.96 0.374 *** 3.88
Working fulltime Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Between 1/3 and 2/3 of fulltime 0.204 *** 3.25 0.288 ** 2.45 0.309 *** 2.61 0.314 *** 2.64 0.315 *** 2.65
Less than 1/3 of fulltime 0.275 *** 2.85 0.179 1.00 0.212 1.18 0.248 1.37 0.193 1.07
Unemployed 0.235 *** 3.05 0.329 ** 2.22 0.344 ** 2.32 0.353 ** 2.36 0.363 ** 2.42
Disabled 0.212 ** 2.56 0.512 *** 3.47 0.492 *** 3.32 0.510 *** 3.44 0.504 *** 3.39
Homemaker 0.336 *** 5.67 0.417 *** 3.33 0.406 *** 3.21 0.428 *** 3.38 0.411 *** 3.23
Other job situation 0.313 *** 3.01 0.723 *** 3.85 0.742 *** 3.92 0.775 *** 4.09 0.763 *** 3.99
Has more than one job 0.118 * 1.84 0.010 0.09 0.048 0.41 0.055 0.47 0.045 0.38
Looks after grandchildren
Daily -0.080 -1.13 0.047 0.32 -0.001 0.00 -0.003 -0.02 0.035 0.23
Weekly 0.138 *** 3.35 0.110 1.43 0.082 1.06 0.073 0.95 0.079 1.02
Monthly 0.089 * 1.91 -0.057 -0.67 -0.077 -0.90 -0.075 -0.88 -0.068 -0.79
Less 0.126 *** 3.05 -0.125 -1.62 -0.143 * -1.84 -0.150 * -1.93 -0.145 * -1.86
N e v e r R e fR e fR e fR e fR e f
Area
Big city Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Suburbs 0.001 0.03 -0.008 -0.09 0.005 0.06 0.012 0.13 0.000 0.00
Larrge town 0.099 ** 2.05 0.071 0.77 0.069 0.73 0.079 0.84 0.063 0.66
Small town 0.127 *** 2.70 0.003 0.04 0.023 0.25 0.036 0.38 0.017 0.18
Rural 0.209 *** 4.50 -0.048 -0.49 -0.040 -0.41 -0.033 -0.34 -0.026 -0.27
Education
No education -0.353 *** -3.29 -0.222 -0.94 -0.181 -0.76 -0.109 -0.46 -0.195 -0.82
Lower education -0.289 *** -6.64 -0.078 -0.77 -0.076 -0.74 -0.076 -0.75 -0.092 -0.90
Lower technical education/ -0.131 *** -3.67 -0.153 ** -2.15 -0.152 ** -2.13 -0.149 ** -2.07 -0.161 ** -2.22
four years of high school
Six years of high school Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Professional bachelor degree 0.076 0.90 0.158 1.03 0.212 1.37 0.193 1.25 0.198 1.27
University master degree 0.236 *** 6.95 0.028 0.38 0.020 0.27 0.013 0.18 -0.006 -0.08
3th cycle university degree, phd 0.540 *** 3.41 0.651 ** 2.37 0.582 ** 2.11 0.602 ** 2.17 0.599 ** 2.14








coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value
Ln(gr. personal income) 0.004 0.76 -0.015 -1.63 -0.016 * -1.71 -0.018 * -1.85 -0.016 * -1.69
Ln(gr. other household income) 0.005 0.93 -0.008 -0.70 -0.007 -0.60 -0.009 -0.74 -0.009 -0.77
Self reported health
Very good self reported health 0.033 1.00
Good self reported health Ref
Fair self reported health -0.135 *** -4.05
Bad self reported health -0.277 *** -4.17
Very bad self reported health -0.751 *** -4.35
Depression (Euro-D scale) -0.012 * -1.69
2 or more health symptoms 0.119 *** 3.82
3 or more mobility limitations -0.020 -0.46
Daily living activities limitations -0.050 -0.83
Instr. daily living limitations -0.129 *** -2.66
Car ownership 0.125 *** 4.74 0.053 0.93 0.065 1.14 0.064 1.12 0.070 1.23
Integration in local community
Lives in community >= 5 years 0.219 *** 4.05
Is an immigrant -0.214 *** -4.39
Country dummies
Austria -0.524 *** -9.61 -0.455 *** -3.14 -0.377 *** -2.59 -0.491 *** -3.31 -0.320 ** -2.12
Germany -0.444 *** -9.26 0.072 0.58 0.079 0.62 0.041 0.32 0.087 0.68
Sweden Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
The Netherlands 0.088 ** 2.04 0.377 *** 4.88 0.404 *** 5.15 0.354 *** 4.50 0.422 *** 5.32
Italy -0.569 ***-10.67 0.113 0.77 0.314 ** 2.03 0.303 ** 2.00 0.533 *** 3.05
France -0.182 *** -3.37 0.233 ** 2.21 0.293 *** 2.71 0.287 *** 2.62 0.287 *** 2.63
Denmark -0.122 ** -2.46 0.067 0.74 0.037 0.37 0.052 0.55 0.065 0.68
Switzerland -0.273 *** -4.33 -0.080 -0.62 -0.020 -0.19 -0.048 -0.36 -0.026 -0.19
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.106 0.46 0.129 0.56 0.172 0.74 0.128 0.55
Motives
Intrumental factor 0.191 *** 7.82 0.261 *** 5.03
Public good factor 0.047 ** 2.00 0.032 0.63
Warm glow factor 0.136 *** 5.82 0.182 *** 3.43
To meet other people -0.072 -1.40
To contribute something useful 0.037 0.73
For personal achievement 0.161 ** 2.19
Because I am needed 0.194 *** 3.96
Because I enjoy it 0.348 *** 6.44
To use my skills or to keep fit 0.264 *** 4.91
Because I feel obligated to do it 0.219 *** 3.48
Cross-effects
Warm glow x Austria -0.187 * -1.77
Instrumental x Germany -0.155 * -1.79
Public good x Germany 0.168 ** 2.05
Instrumental x Netherlands -0.125 * -1.79
Instrumental x Denmark -0.149 * -1.79
# observations 17012 2464 2464 2464 2464
Pseudo R² 0.155 0.094 0.140 0.159 0.185
Log likelihood -6508 -2372 -2323 -2301 -2271
Note.  Significance levels are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Decision Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 5
Marginal effects of motivations
Factor Marginal effect
Intrumental factor








less than weekly -0.051
almost weekly 0.023
almost daily 0.029 
 